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I took a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature with a specialization in Italian literature 
(Dante and Semiotics), taught at UCLA, and worked at the Getty Research Institute for 
the History of Art and the Humanities in Los Angeles for seven years, doing research on 
prospective Scholars and on seminars. I was a producer for a major, international multi-
year project (in cooperation with various Italian institutions) for research on and 
exhibitions of the Italian Renaissance painter “Dosso Dossi.” I also produced, for the 
director, Dr. Salvatore Settis, an annotated bibliography of work in the neurosciences, art 
history, and the humanities on the topic of “visual perception.” While working at the 
GRI, I was diagnosed with adult onset epilepsy, treated with a barrage of medications, 
and underwent “Asleep-Awake-Asleep” neurosurgery. My recovery involved—and still 
involves—substantially different post-resection experiences in language, imagery, and 
memory. I returned to my original work on cognitive processing in Dante’s texts1 with 
an altered sense of polymodal “learning” and “memory.” I did some research on 
epilepsy and neurosurgery and wrote a book about my case.2 When I contacted the 
professor who had mapped my brain during the surgery,3 she invited me to attend her 
class on Functional Neuroanatomy; I have since attended several classes at UCLA in 
Neuroscience, Neurobiology, Cognitive Psychology, and Neurolinguistics.4 And I have 
begun to think about imagery, non-declarative memory, hippocampal RAM, and 
cultural LTP.5 
                                                 
1 with the profound sense of irony that a team of doctors had to carefully map my selva oscura while I took a wild, 
Dantesque, “A-A-A” trip (with Guido da Pisa) in the mezzo of my own cammin. Any citations I draw from Dante's 
Commedia are from Giorgio Petrocchi, ed., La Commedia secondo l'antica vulgata (Milano:  Mondadori, 
1966), unless otherwise noted. 
2 Brainquake: In the Grip of Epilepsy (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2003). 
3 Assoc. Prof. Susan Y. Bookheimer, Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, UCLA. 
4 Please see the attached list for the professors and classes involved. 
5 “Long-term potentiation is the primary experimental model for investigating the synaptic basis of learning and 
memory in vertebrates.” T.V.P. Bliss and G.L. Collingridge, “A Synaptic Model of memory: long-term potentiation in 
the hippocampus.” Nature 361, 7 Jan 1993, 31-39, p. 31. Please note: I will purposely observe the distinct rhetorical 
styles of notation practiced in the disciplines of the sciences and the humanities. 
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My project is in the mode of the “humanities,”6 not the neurosciences; I cannot evade 
the genre of a first-person account.7 While my own “attention” is explicitly one subject of 
this project, another is the concept of attentiveness, a topic—and an issue—of major 
cultural importance.8 This project is not about me. (I’ve written that already.) It’s about a 
perspective on neurological issues that science doesn’t have (and, arguably, wants to 
avoid), and that certain disciplines of humanities insist on [pre]understanding from 
afar.9 In a sense, I am imitating Dante’s rhetorical presentation of his own interior self as 
a whichever brain,10 while standing in Augustine’s caves of memory, hearing Virgil’s 
discourse about Aeneas looking at the images of history on the walls in Carthage. I’m 
not claiming to be another Dante, but my narrative will witness, while my logic will 
argue. Here’s the case: 
While working on understanding Dosso, scholar years on Memory and the Passions, 
and research on visual perception, my own neural circuitry (in the left temporal lobe 
[and hippocampus]) was intermittently blitzing itself in the auditory, visual, linguistic, 
and short-term memory decks. My seizures startle me awake from sleep, and produce 
radically altered, powerful moments of perception in multiple senses, i.e. in existence 
itself. They fragment those senses, pull them apart and itemize them, generating “fear” 
and sending waves of déjà vu. They perform остранение11 on me. They scramble 
language and cognition and then shadow my episodic memory—my µνηµοσύνη 12—of 
them. When I report them to my neurologist, I try to be descriptive, and not narrative—
right lobe, not left.13 And yet, I try for episodic, not semantic14: I try to remember the 
                                                 
6 Invoking distinctions between “Renaissance” and “medieval” models (outlined by A. Grafton and L. Jardine, From 
Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe [Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986]). 
7 Benveniste et al.: who can? See "De la subjectivité dans le langage," Journal de psychologie, 1958, reprinted in 
Problèmes de lingustique générale I.; p. 131: "nihil est in lingua quod non prius fuerit in oratione" in response to 
Acquinas, "nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu."   
8 Aufmerksamkeit is Alois Riegl’s term; Riegl (and von Schlosser) will stand in here as reference to a complicated 
tradition of investigation and analysis of visual reception (see M. Olin’s monograph, Forms of Representation. Alois 
Riegl’s Theory of Art, 1992). There are some parallels between the First Vienna School’s interest in the non-figural, a 
tradition of literary criticism (H.R. Jauss et al), and some work on the neurology of vision itself.  
9 N. Bryson, for example, insists on “the social character of the image, and its reality as sign”—a position staked out in 
Vision and Painting:  the Logic of the Gaze (New Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1983), xii. 
10 Reiterating Singleton’s insistence that “every” and “whichever” are crucially distinct (“The Allegorical Journey” in 
Journey to Beatrice, vol. II of Dante Studies [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958], pp. 3-14, p. 5). 
11 De-familiarization: “…to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The 
technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar’….” Victor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique” in Russian Formalist 
Criticism: Four Essays, eds. Lemon and Reis (University of Nebraska Press, 1965), p. 12. 
12 As the art historian Aby Warburg’s concept of “memory”—I discuss this in more detail. 
13 “The Split Brain Revisited,” by Michael S. Gazzaniga, Scientific American, July 1998, pp 51-55: “False memories 
originate in the left hemisphere...only the right is active during a true memory...” (p. 53); “[w]hen presented with new 
information, people usually remember much of what they experience. When questioned, they also usually claim to 
remember things that were not truly part of the experience. If split-brain patients are given such tests, the left 
hemisphere generates many false reports. But the right brain does not; it provides a much more veridical account ... the 
interpretive mechanism of the left hemisphere is always hard at work, seeking the meaning of events. It is constantly 
looking for order and reason, even when there is none—which leads it continually to make mistakes. It tends to 
overgeneralize, frequently constructing a potential past as opposed to a true one” (p. 54). (In his book, The Mind’s Past 
[University of California Press, 1998], Chapter 6: Real Memories, Phony Memories opens with Augustine’s famous 
citation on memory from Book X of the Confessions [p. 123]. Gazzaniga’s first sentence: “If only it were true.”) I’ll 
discuss this further. 
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experience, rather than analyze—in a classic Manzonian sense—what must have 
happened.15 It’s hard to keep your left temporal lobe from making up stories—or 
theories—but I try. And yet, for this argument, the story is important. 
When Dr. Settis took over the GRI, I undertook a major endeavor, producing a multi-
year, international research and conference project on the Italian cinquecento painter 
known as Dosso Dossi. His work (in the court of Alfonso I d’Este at Ferrara) reflects 
some of the mysteries of Italian Renaissance culture manifest in neo-classical, allegorical 
subject matter (the Getty owns his Allegoria della fortuna and Allegoria con Pan). Our 
seminars addressed (in part) a prominent and difficult topic—how to interpret visual 
imagery with suggestive but (as yet) unclear literary or historical clues. In two years on 
that project, I spent a lot of time in Italy (Roma, Trento, Bologna…) looking at paintings 
(sculpture, monuments, ruins…), and listening to arguments about them. I’m not an art 
historian. Because my background is predominantly literary, I’m more of an argument 
historian. I spent time considering how we were understanding what we were looking at 
(and how we were arguing about it). 
I did research on possible scholars to invite for upcoming scholar years on 
“Memory,” “Collecting” and “Representing the Passions,” all from a variety of 
disciplines. Because Salvatore had asked me to do an annotated bibliography on the 
general topic of “visual perception,” I researched what the “sciences” “know” about 
neural “functions”—involving whether perception is “linguistically” organized or not16 
—and what the “humanities” “know” about the “concept” of “perception.”17 I spent 
some time thinking about my quote marks, and did some Heideggerian “dwelling” on 
how, perhaps, some brains gestalt that we are culturally predetermined, while 
simultaneously dwelling on neuroscientific models of gestalt. And all the while I was 
intermittently having gestalt-fritzing seizures and contemplating whether I was, in any 
sense, relevant to the question of what is or is not “the case” (as opposed to “my case”). 
A question I contemplated: do we learn to make gestalted cultural sense (not just 
“practical sense”) of our perception as a survival tactic? But, still, logically, (culturally 
gestalted) “a“ and (survival) “b” are only corollaries.  
I had more seizures in a Pandora’s box of interlocking physiological and cognitive 
side-effects, “breaking through” all the medications. The only remaining treatment 
option was neurological invasion: “Asleep-Awake-Asleep” left-temporal-lobe 
neurosurgery, an attempt to remove the portions of the brain—as inferred from a battery 
of previous tests—which produce the seizures. I was awake—with my skull sawn open 
and my brain stuck with electrodes—for nearly three hours. Some aides-de camp spoke to 
me in English, Italian and French, because the team had to map the “eloquent cortex”—
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Two distinct modes of memory. See Zola-Morgan S, Squire LR. Neuroanatomy of memory. Ann Rev Neurosci 
1993;16:547–563. 
15 To find “la strada che le cose avrebbero dovuta prendere per arrivare dove sono arrivate,” Del romanzo storico, 
II.i.(paragraph 4), Opere, a cura di R. Bacchelli (Ricciardi: Milano, Napoli, 1953).  
16 The argument of Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), vs. that of Stephen M. Kosslyn, Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery 
Debate (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994) (among others).  
17 Which contributed to the Getty seminar Perception/Art; it took place at the GRI May 5, 1999. 
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the geographical locations of those spoken languages and the performance of verbal 
naming of images of objects—before carefully removing brain tissue where intractable 
seizures originated (like landmines in the naming fields).  
Right after the surgery, what came back first was not my native language, but 
bizarre imagery of random things: segments of Dosso paintings, figures walking in 
conflicting spatial planes, a klettersteig on a mountain in the Dolomites, mutating three-
dimensional geometric forms, the vase from Simone Martini’s Annunciazione, zoom shots 
of feet in a mosaic, and fractured snippets of Russian—a language in a different alphabet 
learned twenty years before and no longer spoken.18 In short, another universe. 
I have difficulty, now, with names and nouns. In order to find words or construct 
sentences, I often have to construct words by sorting through acoustic rhymes or visual 
images, sometimes of things and loci, or of the written words. Sometimes I have to 
reason my way through multi-lingual syllables.19 Language itself—for me—is now a 
distinctly different world. Why? Because of packet-switching in my synapses.  
Now I go to classes in various schools of the neurosciences. I listen with profound 
curiosity as the professors construct narratives to explain experiments done on synaptic 
functions of the hippocampus (locus of my seizures and a major target of synaptic 
neuroscience20). I listen to their rhetoric and contemplate their visual artifacts—
diagrams, symbols, graphs, math—trying to understand the logic of the problem. But 
now—post-surgery—I also have to stave off marauding imagery of numbers climbing 
boxes and shooting arrows and Greek letters teeter-tottering with each other.   
 
Things, for me, have changed.21 Thinking—in discourse and imagery—has 
transmogrified.  Thinking about discourse and imagery has transmogrified. 
 
ΜΝΗΜΟΣΥΝΗ:  Nel mezzo del engram maps some of the multiple dimensions of this 
larger selva oscura. 
 
The exploratory team includes Pietro Alighieri, Guido da Pisa, Aby Warburg, 
Michael Baxandall, David Freedbeerg, Antonio Damasio, Michael Gazzaniga, Joseph 
LeDoux, Larry Squire, C.S. Peirce, Gianni Vattimo, Augustine of Hippo, Karl Lashley, 
                                                 
18 From Bookheimer’s neuroanatomy class: the brain makes functional anatomical distinctions, not only between 
imagery and language, but among the categories of language(s): speaking, writing, understanding, hearing, and reading. 
19 There are different pathways (superior and inferior) for segment phonology and piecemeal analysis versus whole 
word recognition. Different parts of the brain “store” different kinds of things and processes; language is (almost 
always) in the left temporal lobe; music, prosody, intonations, environmental noises are processed in the right. 
Symbolic math involves the temporal, parietal and the occipital lobes. The anterior frontal lobe puts separate things 
together in chunks. Her summary: “Any kind of chunking works.”  
20 “The hippocampal formation has attracted considerable attention during the recent explosion of interest in cellular 
and synaptic neuroscience… (a) It is a region of the brain implicated in a number of important (and interesting) 
“normal” behaviors, such as learning and memory; (b) both functionally and structurally, the hippocampus shows an 
unusual degree of neuronal “plasticity”; (c) it has been implicated as a focus of pathology in a number of neurologic 
disorders ranging from epilepsy to global ischemia to Alzheimer’s disease to traumatic head injury….” Jerome Engel, 
Jr. and Timothy A. Pedley, Epilepsy. The Comprehensive CD-Rom. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 1999; Chapter 28: 
Limbic Anatomy and Physiology. 
21 Both cogitans and extensa. 
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Richard Semon, C.P. Snow, Stephen Kosslyn, Semir Zeki, E. O. Wilson, the stone 
Assyrian bas-relief from Nimrud, Charles Singleton, Ernst Curtius, Dosso Dossi, Dante 
Alighieri, and the Horn of Ammon. 
 
The humanities could argue that the narrative of science is just another narrative. Art 
history could argue that it (art history) alone embraces (or subsumes?) the visual.22 
Science, including Neuroscience, could argue that it’s trying to use something other than 
left-temporal-lobe stories to think with, because there is something other than the story 
to (choose your verb here) … “think about.” The voyage of the vast frontal lobe (through 
time and space) might be to get the myelinated troops from boot-camp, “image” some 
vectors for this problem and try them out. Do we want to stroll the portico and 
rhetorically argue ourselves into thinking that we already know how we can think? That 
we know all the vectors? Or shall we try to grok some LTP and send out another recon 









UCLA Classes in the Neurosciences pertinent to this paper: 
 
Information on most of these professors can be found at the website: 
COMPLETE LIST OF NEUROSCIENCE FACULTY 
http://www.medsch.ucla.edu/som/bri/nsidp/faculty/fullfac.htm  




Ad hoc class on functional neuroanatomy, Susan Y. Bookheimer, Psychiatry 
    and Biobehavioral Sciences 
Winter 01 
Neurosci M130 Biological bases of psychiatric disorders - Levine, M.S. 
Linguistics C235. Neurolinguistics - Curtiss, S.R. 
See: http://www.linguistics.ucla.edu/people/curtiss/curtiss.htm 
Spring 01 
Neurobio 200E. Regulatory, Behavioral, and Cognitive Neurobiology - Micevych, P.E. / Silva, 
A.J. et al (see below) 
Neurosci m205. Behavioral & Systems Neuroscience - Colwell, C.S. et al (see below) 
Psychtry 208B. Clinical Neuropsychiatry - Asarnow, R.F. 
Psych 265. Thinking – Holyoak, K. 
                                                 
22 Even if, on the part of some, as a kind of graphical user interface of essentially linguistic “concepts”—I discuss this 
in more detail. 
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See: http://www.psych.ucla.edu/Faculty/HOLYOAK/Default.htm 
Winter 02 
M169 History of Neurosciences - Frank Jr, R.G. 
 
Several of these classes were taught by teams including: 
 
Department of Psychiatry & Biobehavioral Sciences  
Mark Barad  
Susan Y. Bookheimer 
Christopher Colwell 
Alcino J. Silva (also Depts. of Neurobiology and Psychology) 
 
Departments of Neurobiology and Psychology 
Dean Buonomano 
 
Department of Neurobiology 
Roger Gorski 
Charles Woody (also Dept. of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences) 
 
Department of Physiological Science 
David Glanzman 
 
Department of Psychology 
Stan Schein 
 
